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Abstract. The use of passwords for user authentication has become
ubiquitous in our everyday lives. However, password theft is becoming a
common occurrence due to a variety of security problems associated with
passwords. As such, many organizations are moving towards adopting
alternative solutions like one-time passwords, which are only valid for
a single session. Nevertheless, various one-time password schemes also
suffer from a number of drawbacks in terms of their method of genera-
tion or delivery. This paper presents the design of a challenge-response
visual one-time password authentication scheme that is to be used in
conjunction with the camera on a mobile device. The main purpose of
the proposed scheme is to be able to send a challenge over a public
channel for a user to obtain a session key, while safeguarding the user’s
long-term secret key. In this paper, we present the authentication pro-
tocol, the various design considerations and the advantages provided by
the scheme.
Keywords: Authentication, one-time password, mobile device, visual cryptogra-
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1 Introduction
In this day and age, passwords are widely used in everyday life for user authenti-
cation on the Internet. Despite having been used for many years, text passwords
are still the most dominant form of web authentication due to its convenience
and simplicity [26]. However, the use of passwords has been shown to be plagued
by various security problems [2, 3]. In addition, over the years many security
attacks, such as spyware and phishing attacks, have been used to extract sensi-
tive information from computers, emails, fraudulent websites, etc., resulting in
password theft becoming a common occurrence.
For this reason, many business companies and organizations are moving to-
ward adopting alternative solutions to the traditional static password approach.
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Static password approaches are particularly vulnerable as these passwords can
easily be stolen by an adversary via a variety of means (e.g. keyloggers, phish-
ing attacks, Trojans, etc.), and used without the password owner’s knowledge.
This has led to the increasing popularity of One-Time Password (OTP) schemes,
where a password is only valid for a single session. For example, Google’s au-
thentication framework using two-step verification employs an OTP approach
[7]. In Google’s two-step verification, the first step involves the user using the
traditional username and static password authentication. In the second step, the
user will be asked for a six-digit verification code (the OTP) which the user can
obtain through a number of different means, for example, via a Short Message
Service (SMS) text message, a voice call to a preregistered phone number, a list
of pre-generated one-time codes, or an offline application pre-installed on the
user’s smartphone [7].
There are a number of common ways in which OTPs can be generated and
distributed. However, it has been contended that a number of these methods
suffer from various drawbacks. For instance, it has been observed that sending
an OTP via SMS to a user’s mobile phone cannot be considered to be secure [18].
For one thing, the security of SMS OTP relies on the confidentiality of the SMS
messages and the security of the cellular networks, which cannot be guaranteed
as there are already several potential attacks that can be conducted on these
services. Furthermore, specialized mobile phone Trojans have been created that
compromise the security of SMS OTP approaches [18]. Moreover, this approach
can be problematic to use if the user is in a location with poor mobile phone
reception.
An approach that is commonly used by banks and financial institutions, is
to supply the user with a security token which generates OTPs. One technique
to generate OTPs on a security token is to use a time dependent pseudo-random
algorithm. This approach relies on accurate time synchronization between the
token and the authentication server, as the OTPs generated using this approach
are only valid for a short period of time. As such, this approach suffers from
synchronization issues and the potential for clock skew [23]. Another approach
of generating OTPs on security tokens is to use a one-way function in the form of
a hash chain. However, hash chains are known to have storage and computational
complexity issues [24].
In this paper, we propose a challenge-response visual OTP authentication
scheme that uses the camera on a mobile device to obtain the OTP. The purpose
of the scheme is to be able to send a challenge over a public channel for a user
to obtain a session key, while safeguarding the user’s long-term secret key. Our
approach is based on the concept of visual cryptography and as such does not
rely on mobile phone network reception, or having to establish a network link
between a computer and a mobile phone. This paper presents the authentication
protocol along with various practical issues that had to be considered in the
design of the visual OTP scheme.
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Our Contribution. This paper presents the design of a visual one-time pass-
word authentication scheme. The proposed scheme is a challenge-response ap-
proach that relies on a camera on a mobile device to receive the challenge and
to present the response on the mobile device’s display. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not suffer from common OTP issues concerning mobile
phone reception, hash chain complexities or time synchronization mechanisms.
In addition, unlike SMS-based approaches, our approach is not restricted to mo-
bile phones and can be used on any mobile device with a camera and display,
including tablet computers. In the proposed scheme, the challenge can even be
sent on printed media instead of via electronic means.
2 Related Work
Over the years, researchers have proposed a variety of different authentication
approaches. In this section, we review the research in the area of authentication
that is relevant to our work.
2.1 Visual Authentication
The notion of using human-computer cryptographic approaches for identification
and authentication have been around for many years. These approaches typically
rely on a challenge-response mechanism that requires a human user to interact
with a computer in some manner in order to perform authentication. For ex-
ample, Matsumoto [16, 17] investigated human-computer cryptographic schemes
that presented challenges to users in the form of visual images. The approach
that was examined in his study relied on the human ability for memorizing and
processing to solve the simple challenges. Since then, other researchers and prac-
titioners have also proposed and developed various graphical password schemes.
Graphical passwords attempt to leverage human memory for visual information
with the shared secret being related to images [1]. This capitalizes on the natu-
ral human ability to remember images, which is believed to exceed memory for
text [3]. However, graphical passwords are not immune to security attacks. For
example, graphical password schemes may suffer from shoulder surfing attacks
where credentials are captured through direct observation of the login process,
or by recording the process using a recording device [1].
Other schemes that have been proposed in this area are based on using the
human visual system to solve the challenge. Naor and Pinkas [19] proposed an
authentication and identification approach that is based on visual cryptography.
Visual cryptography was introduced by Naor and Shamir [20] as a means of
using images to conceal information. The main idea behind visual cryptography
is to divide a secret image into a set of shares, each to be printed on a separate
transparency. Individually, the shares look like random black and white pixels
that reveal no information about the secret image. When the appropriate num-
ber of shares are stacked together, the human visual system averages the black
and white pixel contributions of the superimposed shares to recover the hidden
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(a) (b) (c)
(d)
Fig. 1. Example of Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography scheme. (a) Secret image;
(b) Share 1; (c) Share 2; (d) Result of superimposing shares 1 and 2.
information. Thus, the concealed information can be decrypted by the human
visual system without any need of a computer to perform decryption computa-
tions [4]. Figure 1 depicts an example of Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography
scheme. The secret image, shown in Figure 1(a), is divided into two shares, which
are shown in Figures 1(b) and 1(c) respectively. The secret can be recovered by
superimposing the two shares, as shown in Figure 1(d).
In the scheme proposed by Naor and Pinkas [19], the user is required to
carry a small transparency, small enough to be carried in a wallet, and the au-
thentication and identification process simply involves the user overlaying the
transparency on the message sent by an informant in order to view the con-
cealed information. However, in their scheme, unless the user carries a stack of
transparencies, which would be impractical, a single transparency will have to
be used for multiple authentication sessions. It has been highlighted that since
basic visual cryptography schemes are equivalent to one-time pads, an observer
can eventually learn the user’s secret by repeated observation [3]. In addition,
Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography scheme suffers from the pixel expansion
problem, as illustrated in Figure 1, where each pixel in the secret image is split
into four sub-pixels in the shares and the recovered image. As such, the shares
are four time the size of the secret image.
To overcome a number of drawbacks with this scheme, Tuyls et al. [27] pro-
posed a scheme where every user was to be given a small decryption display.
Their approach was similarly based on visual cryptography where the small
decryption display was used to replace the need for transparencies. The small
decryption display required very limited computing power to perform authenti-
cation and security and since the user was required to carry his/her own trusted
decryption display, it would be impossible to be contaminated by Trojans or
viruses. However, this approach requires the user to use a special authentication
device.
A commercially available scheme called PassWindow [22] uses a similar ap-
proach where a small transparent display is embedded in an ID card or some
form of payment card. The pattern on the transparent display changes periodi-
cally based on a pre-generated sequence of patterns. To perform authentication,
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the user has to overlay the transparent display of the card over a patterned im-
age sent from the server and to visually identify the digits that form as a result
of superimposing the card’s display onto the image. However, it should be noted
that an image on screen can potentially appear at different sizes depending on
the user’s display settings. This approach requires that the size of the image that
is displayed on screen be exactly the same as the size of the card’s transparent
display.
2.2 Authentication using a Personal Device
A number of other authentication approaches that have been proposed make
use of personal devices that a user usually carries around (e.g. a cellphone). In a
study on how to provide a user with authenticated communication when using
an untrusted computer, Clarke et al. [5] proposed a method of using a trusted
personal device equipped with a camera to monitor the screen of the untrusted
computer. All communication is then authenticated by a trusted proxy. This
approach is quite costly in terms of computational resources required to monitor
the communication.
Mannan and Oorschot [15] proposed a protocol that they called MP-Auth
(M obile Password Authentication), which uses a mobile device to protect user
passwords from easily being recorded. In their approach, the mobile device is
assumed to be free from malware as the user will enter the password into the
mobile device rather than into an untrusted computer. In another approach
proposed by Jeun et al. [11], the user uses an application to store his encrypted
password in his smart phone and that application program is used to send the
password from the smart phone itself, instead of requiring the user to enter his
password via a computer’s keyboard.
Phoolproof is another scheme that uses mobile phones for authentication.
Phoolproof is a mutual authentication protocol used to prevent phishing using
a trusted mobile phone [21]. To use the system, the user must establish a shared
secret with the server using an out-of-band channel. This long-term secret is
stored on the mobile phone. In order to use this protocol, the mobile phone must
establish a secure Bluetooth connection with the web-browser where mutual
authentication occurs between the mobile phone and the website.
2.3 One-Time Passwords
To overcome some of the problems associated with static passwords, OTP ap-
proaches are increasingly being used for authentication. There are various tech-
niques for generating and distributing OTPs. In addition, several approaches
were devised to use OTPs in conjunction with mobile devices.
Paterson and Stebila [23] examined an approach of using OTPs in conjunc-
tion with one-time Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols
in order to ensure more secure use of OTPs. In a scheme called oPass proposed
by Sun et al. [26], a trusted cellphone is used to communicate with the web
server (via SMS) and the web-browser (via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth). The user does
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not input his password into the web-browser, but rather is required to enter his
long-term password into the oPass program which will generate an OTP that
will be sent by way of an encrypted SMS to the server.
Mulliner et al. [18] investigated attacks against SMS based OTPs and state
that attacks against cellular networks and mobile phones have shown that SMS
messages cannot be deemed to be secure. They proposed a virtual dedicated
OTP channel inside the mobile phone operating system to secure OTP SMS
messages from being intercepted by Trojans by removing these messages from
the general delivery process and redirecting them to a special OTP application.
Instead of using a mobile device, Huang et al. [9] proposed a scheme where
the OTP is delivered via an instant messaging service. This approach assumes
that the website which adopts the OTP authentication method must join an
instant messaging network and use the network to communicate with the users.
3 Model and Definition of the Visual One-Time Password
Authentication System
In this section, we will first define the visual one-time password authentication
system and its scenario, and then we will propose a visual authentication pro-
tocol. We extend this definition from the visual authentication scheme proposed
by Naor and Pinkas [19].
Visual OTP Authentication Scenario
Without losing generality, we assume that there are three entities involved,
namely H (Henry), S (Sandra) and an adversary E (Evan). H is a human
and therefore H has human visual capabilities. The purpose of the visual OTP
authentication system is to enable Sandra to attest whether Henry is present in
the protocol in the presence of Evan. Note that Evan can observe the channel
used between Henry and Sandra. The security parameter k is involved, such that
storage capacities and computing power of Sandra and Evan are polynomial in
k.
There are two main stages in the visual OTP authentication scenario. The
first stage is the initialization stage, where Sandra can communicate with Henry
in an offline private initialization channel, which is inaccessible to Evan. In the
second stage, Sandra communicates with Henry via a public channel, in which
Evan can also access.
In the first stage, Sandra issues a long-term secret key, lk, to Henry, where its
size is polynomial in the security parameter k. In the second stage, Sandra tests
to ensure that Henry has acquired lk by producing a random number r, which
is sent via a public channel. Henry will then construct a shared visual secret,
which is a function of lk and r. For simplicity, this visual share is denoted as S1.
Subsequently, Sandra produces a short-term secret key, sk, and constructs its
visual version, Ssk. Then, Sandra will construct another visual share S2, where
S2 = Ssk −S1 (an example of an algorithm that can be used to generate S1 and
S2 is provided in Algorithm 1 below). Subsequently, S2 is presented to Henry via
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a public channel. Evan has access to the public channel, and therefore, he has
access to both r and S2. Nevertheless, Evan does not have access to S1. Using
his visual observation capability, Henry can acquire the short-term key, sk, from
S1 and S2.
Visual OTP Authentication Protocol
S would like to communicate to H to test whether H can reproduce a short-term
secret key, sk, in the presence of an adversary E.
– S chooses a random r.
– S generates the short-term key sk and its visual representation Ssk.
– S produces the first share S1, which is a function of lk and r.
– S computes the second share S2, which is computed from Ssk − S1.
– S sends (r, S2) to H via a public channel.
– H needs to reproduce S1 from lk and r.
– H uses his visual capability to acquire Ssk from S1 and S2, and hence, obtains
sk.
We note that the public channel is accesible to E. In addition, only S can
generate a valid S2. E will not be able to generate a valid S2 without knowledge
of lk.
Definition 1. Security. A visual OTP authentication protocol is called secure
if E cannot retrieve sk after observing the public channel used by S and H to
communicate.
4 Proposed Visual OTP Scheme
4.1 Design
The overall design of the proposed visual OTP scheme is described as follows.
Initialization Stage. H registers with S, in which S will issue a long-term
secret key, lk, which has a polynomial size in the security parameter k. lk will
be transmitted to H via a secure and authenticated channel. In practice, S can
make use of either a traditional public key cryptography (assumingH is equipped
with a public key) or an identity-based encryption (assuming the identity of H
is known - in a smart phone scenario, this could be via the phone’s International
Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) or phone number).
Challenge-Response Stage. In this stage, S selects a random number r, which
has a polynomial size in the security parameter k. Then, S will conduct the
following:
– Produce a Quick Response (QR) code that contains r, QRr.
– Generate a short-term secret key sk, and its visual representation Ssk.
– Generate the first share S1, which is derived from lk||r, where || denotes
concatenation.
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– Generate the second share S2 = Ssk − S1.
– Present QRr and S2 to H via a public channel.
Upon receiving the challenge (QRr, S2), H conducts the following:
– Scan the QR code to retrieve r.
– Use the long-term secret key, lk and r to produce S1.
– Use H’s visual capability to retrieve sk from S1 and S2.
– Output sk.
Note that the value of sk is obtained visually and is never stored anywhere.
Figure 2 depicts an example of a practical scenario where the visual OTP scheme
can be implemented for conducting an online transaction. The figure gives an
overview of the communication between the different components involved in
the overall process. In the scenario, the user must first register his mobile device
with the authentication server via a secure private channel. The server will in
turn generate lk and send this to the user’s mobile device. Registration only
happens once for the server and mobile device to establish a long-term secret
key. Subsequently, whenever the user initiates an online transaction from a web-
browser, the server will generate and send (QRr, S2) (i.e. the challenge) which
will be displayed on the web-browser. Upon receiving (QRr, S2), the user will
use the camera on his mobile device to scan QRr. With the value of lk and r, the
user’s mobile device will be able to generate S1. On the mobile device’s display,
S1 will be overlaid on S2 to produce S
′
sk (i.e. the visual reconstruction of Ssk on
the mobile device’s display), and the user will be able to visually obtain sk (i.e.
the response/OTP). Only the server can generate a valid S2, and only the user
can obtain sk using S1 which is generated on the mobile device.
4.2 Practical Issues
In the proposed scheme, r has to be sent to H over a public channel. While it is
not necessary to encode and transmit r within a QR code, we find that this is
the most appropriate and convenient method of delivery. The QR code is a two-
dimensional code that was invented by the company Denso Wave [6]. These days,
QR codes are ubiquitous on the Internet and the information contained within
a QR code can easily be scanned by a mobile device with a camera. In addition,
QR codes have a inbuilt error detection and correction mechanism that can be
used to correctly decode corrupted QR codes, which may contain certain errors.
Furthermore, QR codes contain a number of patterns to determine rotational
orientation and alignment. Since (QRr, S2) is sent to H as a single image, QRr
can be used to facilitate the alignment of S1 and S2.
It is well known that traditional visual cryptography suffers from the align-
ment problem, in that when stacking shares, it is difficult to align the shares
[14, 30]. Practical approaches typically suggest the use of some reference frame
to align the transparencies [19]. However, unlike traditional approaches that use
physical transparencies or tokens, our approach relies on the use of a mobile
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Fig. 2. Overview of the communication between the various components in the visual
OTP scheme.
device like a smart phone or a tablet. As such, using the camera’s video stream
to capture (QRr, S2), this can be used in conjunction with image processing
techniques to overlay S1 over S2. This is akin to techniques using in augmented
reality to overlay virtual content onto elements of the real world [28]. Adopting
this method will allow the mobile device to appropriately scale and rotate S1 in
order for it to align with S2.
Another problem with traditional visual cryptography when displaying a
share on a computer screen and trying to place the corresponding share, which
is printed on a transparency, on top of the screen, is that monitors can differ
greatly and the computer can be set to different display settings. As such, the
image of the share on screen may not be displayed at the same size as the share
printed on the transparency. This will prevent the shares from being correctly
superimposed, and thus the secret cannot be recovered. In the approach proposed
in this paper, we rely on the mobile device to virtually overlay S1 over S2. This
means that it does not matter what size S2 is displayed at, as long as the mobile
device can accurately capture the image of S2, because the mobile device can
scale S1 to the appropriate size. To facilitate this, the size of the squares in S2’s
image should not be too small.
As previously shown in Figure 1, traditional visual cryptography suffers from
the pixel expansion problem which significantly increases the size of the resulting
shares. While there are a number of size invariant visual cryptography schemes
like the probabilistic approaches proposed by Ito et al. [10] and Yang [29], these
schemes do not produce the ideal visual quality required for the visual OTP.
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Therefore, for the purpose of generating S1 and S2, a random grid visual cryp-
tography approach was deemed to be the most suitable approach. Random grid
visual secret sharing was first proposed by Kefri and Keren [12], and over the
years a number of random grid approaches have been investigated [8, 25]. Using
a random grid visual cryptography scheme, it is possible to produce shares with
no pixel expansion.
In the proposed visual OTP scheme, the shared image S1 will be generated
from lk||r and a pseudo-random number generator. Thus, S1 is a random grid.
S1 can be used in conjunction with the secret image Ssk to generate the corre-
sponding challenge image S2. Algorithm 1 gives an example of a random grid
visual secret sharing method that was adapted from Shyu [25], which can be
used in the proposed visual OTP scheme. In this approach, black pixels in Ssk
are reproduced at 100% in S′sk and white pixels (i.e. transparent pixels) are re-
produced at 50%. Figure 3 shows the results of using Algorithm 1 on a secret
image. The secret image, shares 1 and 2, along with the reconstructed image are
shown in Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) respectively.
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for generating S1 and S2 from Ssk
function GenerateShares(Ssk, lk, r)
imgWidth← Ssk width
imgHeight← Ssk height
for i = 1 to imgWidth do
for j = 1 to imgHeight do
/* Generate S1 as a random grid */
S1[i, j]← randomPixel(lk||r) /* randomPixel() outputs 0 or 1 */
/* Generate S2 */
if Ssk[i, j] = 0 then
S2[i, j]← S1[i, j]
else





Another practical issue to consider when implementing the visual OTP scheme
is how clearly the user will be able to perceive the OTP in the visual recon-
struction of the secret image. For this we should consider the color of the text
and the background. There are two possible variations as depicted in Figure 4,
where Figure 4(a) shows the reconstructed secret using black text on a white
background and Figure 4(b) shows the reconstructed secret using white text on a
black background. It has been argued that using white contents on a black back-
ground gives rise to better perceived visual quality in the reconstructed image
for images with thin lines [13].
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(a) (b) (c)
(d)
Fig. 3. Random grid visual cryptography approach. (a) Secret image; (b) Share 1; (c)
Share 2; (d) Result of superimposing shares 1 and 2.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Text and background color. (a) Black text on a white background; (b) White
text on a black background.
5 Discussion
5.1 Advantages of the Visual OTP Scheme
The fundamental purpose of the proposed visual OTP scheme is to be able to
send a challenge over a public channel for the user to obtain a session key that
can be used as an OTP, while safeguarding the user’s long-term secret key. In
this scheme, the user also does not have to remember any passwords.
As mobile devices are ubiquitous in this day and age, the proposed approach
does not require the user to carry around a specialized authentication card or
device, or a printed list of OTPs. In addition, unlike authentication schemes
like SMS OTP based approaches, authentication in the proposed method does
not require any form of communication with a mobile phone network. As such,
mobile phone network reception is not an issue. This also means that the visual
OTP scheme can be applied to any mobile device which has a camera and is not
restricted to only be usable on smart phones. The user simply has to install the
visual OTP software and register it with the authentication server.
While the OTP can be used to authenticate the user, another feature pro-
vided by the scheme is that the user can also verify that the message containing
the challenge was sent by a legitimate party. This is because in the proposed
scheme, without knowledge of the long-term secret key an adversary cannot
generate a valid challenge. This also prevents an adversary from tampering with
the challenge image, as changing QRr will mean that the mobile device will not
be able to generate the correct visual pattern (i.e. S1) to solve the challenge,
and changing S2 will not produce a valid result when overlaying S1 over S2.
Furthermore, such an event would raise the suspicion of the user, as it would
indicate that the challenge may have been tampered with.
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Another advantage of the proposed scheme, is that the challenge does not
have to be transmitted via electronic means. For example, if a bank wants to send
a letter to an individual who has registered with the bank, the bank can send
the person a letter with the challenge printed on paper. The person can verify
that the letter was indeed sent from the bank (as only the bank can generate a
valid challenge) and also receive the OTP which can be used for authentication
purposes with the bank.
In other authentication approaches that involve the user having to overlay
a transparency or an authentication token on top of another pattern, the size
of the patterns have to perfectly match. Otherwise the user will not be able
to recover the secret by superimpose the different sized patterns. This is not
an issue in the proposed approach as the mobile device will be responsible for
scaling and aligning the patterns. Therefore, the challenge can be displayed in
any size as long as it can be captured by the mobile device’s camera. The mobile
device will then use augmented reality techniques to overlay the virtual pattern
onto the image of the challenge pattern.
It should be noted that the OTP is obtained by the human user via the visual
channel and the OTP is never stored on any device. This prevents malicious
software like keyloggers or even software designed to monitor the user’s activities
from obtaining the OTP. Furthermore, the one-time password is only valid for
a single use. Additionally, the video stream on the mobile device will be used to
overlay the visual patterns and present this to the user in real-time. If there is
any software designed to monitor the user’s activities, this will require a huge
amount of information to be streamed to the adversary, which will significantly
degrade the system’s performance and alert the user of suspicious activity.
In addition, unlike traditional graphical passwords, which may suffer from
shoulder surfing attacks, this is not an issue in the proposed visual scheme.
Shoulder surfing attacks are where an adversary standing behind the user, and
possibly even recording the user’s interactions, maybe able to observe and detect
some pattern in the image or from the user’s interactions, which will compromise
the security of the visual password. In the proposed visual OTP scheme, the
visual pattern generated on the mobile device to solve a challenge can only
be used for that particular challenge. The mobile device will generate different
visual patterns for different challenges.
5.2 Limitations
In this section we discuss some of the limitations of the propose visual OTP
scheme.
As with all visual challenges or passwords, the proposed scheme relies on the
human visual system. This means that it does not cater for the blind or visually
impaired, and cannot be used by an individual with a visual disability. Another
potential disadvantage is that the challenge image will have to be displayed at
a certain size in order for the mobile device’s camera to be able to accurately
capture the information contained within the challenge image. While this is not
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seen as a major problem, it may adversely affect the layout or aesthetics of a
message, document or webpage.
It should be noted that the proposed scheme does not deal with man-in-the-
middle or similar attacks. To handle such attacks, the scheme can be combined
with other security protocols that are designed to handle man-in-the-middle
attacks. In addition, this approach also does not address the situation where the
authentication server is hacked. The server is responsible for its own security
and it is assumed that all the necessary security mechanisms are in place.
In the proposed scheme, the mobile device captures the challenge image us-
ing its video stream and is responsible for overlaying the virtual image on top
of the challenge image. As such, it is assume that the mobile device has the
computational capabilities required to process augmented reality techniques in
real-time. Additionally, since the mobile device has to be used to visually present
the solution to the challenge, a separate means of displaying the challenge has to
be employed. In other words, if the user wants to conduct an online transaction
via a web-browser, this cannot be done using the mobile device’s web-browser as
the mobile device itself will have to be used in conjunction with the challenge’s
display to obtain the OTP. However, this requirement is no different from several
other authentication schemes that were previously presented in Section 2 of this
paper, which also require the use a web-browser and a separate mobile phone to
perform authentication.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the design of a challenge-response visual OTP au-
thentication scheme. Using this scheme, a challenge is sent to a registered indi-
vidual, this can be via a web-browser or even printed media, and the user can
use the camera and display of his mobile device to obtain the solution to the
challenge. This approach can be implemented on a variety of mobile devices,
such as mobile phones and tablets, with the main requirement being that the
device must have a camera. The challenge itself can be transmitted over a pub-
lic channel without the threat of it being compromised by an adversary, as the
adversary can neither correctly generate nor solve the challenge. As such, the
scheme does not suffer from the common issues affecting the generation and de-
livery of OTPs such as mobile phone reception, hash chain complexities or time
synchronization mechanisms. In addition, this scheme does not suffer from secu-
rity issues like shoulder surfing attacks or keyloggers, as the mobile device will
generate the specific visual pattern required to solve a particular challenge and
will generate a different visual pattern when presented with a different challenge.
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